Do Voters Affect Policies? Within-Coalition Competition in the Chilean Electoral System by Argote, Pablo & Navia, Patricio
www.ssoar.info
Do Voters Affect Policies? Within-Coalition
Competition in the Chilean Electoral System
Argote, Pablo; Navia, Patricio
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Argote, P., & Navia, P. (2018). Do Voters Affect Policies? Within-Coalition Competition in the Chilean Electoral System.
Journal of Politics in Latin America, 10(1), 3-28. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10955
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0
Journal of Politics in 
Latin America 
 
 
 
 
 
Argote, Pablo, and Patricio Navia (2018),  
Do Voters Affect Policies? Within-Coalition Competition in the Chilean Electoral 
System, in: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 10, 1, 3–28. 
 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10955 
 
ISSN: 1868-4890 (online), ISSN: 1866-802X (print) 
 
The online version of this article can be found at: <www.jpla.org> 
 
 
 
Published by  
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Latin American Studies 
and Hamburg University Press. 
 
The Journal of Politics in Latin America is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ilas@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.jpla.org> 
 
The Journal of Politics in Latin America is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which also 
includes Africa Spectrum, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs: <www.giga-journal-family.org>. 
 
 
  Journal of Politics in Latin America 1/2018: 3–28    
 
Do Voters Affect Policies?  
Within-Coalition Competition in the  
Chilean Electoral System 
Pablo Argote and Patricio Navia 
Abstract: It has been argued that close elections lead to policy conver-
gence, as legislators elected by a small margin are more likely to adopt 
moderate policy positions (Downs 1957). However, Lee, Moretti, and 
Butler (2004) find that electoral competition does not affect legislators’ 
policy preferences in the United States, questioning the median voter 
paradigm. To help to discern this paradox, we estimate the effect of 
close elections on legislators’ subsequent policy positions under different 
electoral rules. With Chile’s two-seat open-list proportional representa-
tion system, we exploit the dynamics of within-coalition competition to 
test both hypotheses. Using the margin of victory in 383 races in four 
different parliamentary elections and 3,741 roll-call votes for the 120-seat 
Chamber of Deputies from 1998 to 2014, we find that electoral competi-
tion did not lead to policy convergence under either the center-left Con-
certación coalition or the rightist Alianza coalition. We contend that 
policy convergence responds to electoral incentives but is also condi-
tioned by the nature of the political regime (presidential or parliamen-
tary) and government–opposition dynamics. 
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Introduction 
Do voters affect or elect policies (Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004)? Some 
argue that electoral competition can lead to policy convergence, as it 
compels politicians to adopt middle-ground positions in line with a dis-
trict’s median voter (Downs 1957). However, since politicians cannot 
make credible commitments toward a policy agenda, they also have in-
centives to pursue their preferred policies, which can result in policy 
divergence (Alesina 1988). The two hypotheses lead to different predic-
tions regarding the effects of electoral competition. For instance, in the 
policy convergence hypothesis, a US Democratic candidate who wins by 
a small margin is more likely to compromise and adopt moderate policy 
positions. Concretely, the candidate’s voting record would be similar to 
that of a US Republican candidate who also won by a slim margin. In 
contrast, the policy divergence hypothesis predicts that a legislator’s roll-
call voting will be independent of the margin of victory. By using a re-
gression discontinuity design (RDD), Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) 
estimate the causal effect of close elections on subsequent roll-call voting 
records in the US House of Representative, finding strong evidence of 
policy divergence in these first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral districts. 
Chile offers a unique context for testing these two competing hy-
potheses under a presidential regime and different electoral rules. Fol-
lowing its transition to democracy in 1989 until 2013, Chile used an 
across-the-board two-seat proportional representation (PR) system for 
both chambers of its national legislature. To win both seats, a coalition 
needed to receive more than twice the vote of the second-largest coali-
tion. Since that rarely happened, the most common seat distribution 
divided the two seats between the two largest electoral alliances. Thus, 
the Chilean electoral system created a within-coalition FPTP system, as 
candidates knew that their victory likely depended on getting more votes 
than their coalition partners. 
Presumably, this would have encouraged candidates to adopt policy 
positions aligned with their coalition’s median voter. Consequently, by 
exploiting within-coalition competition and partisan heterogeneity 
among coalitions partners, we1 aim to extend the application of a RDD 
from single-member districts to PR systems with a district magnitude of 
2. More specifically, our purpose is to address the following research 
                                                 
1  We would like to thank Hernán Campos, David Martínez and two anonymous 
reviewers, for their comments and suggestions. This article was partially funded 
by FONDECYT Regular (#1171051) and CONICYT/FONDAP (#15130 
009). 
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questions: What was the effect of electoral competition on subsequent 
roll-call voting records within the two major coalitions in Chilean poli-
tics? Did electoral competition produce a high degree of policy conver-
gence toward the median voter within the two major alliances? How did 
this effect differ between the center-left Concertación and the rightist 
Alianza? Which other intervening factors might have been at play? These 
four research questions will allow us to address how the dynamic of 
within-coalition competition affects legislators’ policy positions in PR 
systems with small district magnitudes in the context of a presidential 
regime. 
The paper continues as follows: First, we present our theory. We 
then describe the Chilean electoral and political systems before outlining 
our empirical strategy and the data. After that, we present the main re-
sults and robustness checks. Finally, we discuss the main conclusions. 
Median Voter and Credibility 
The classic median voter model states that in a majoritarian electoral 
system with single-member districts, if two candidates are only interested 
in winning elections, they will compete for votes by choosing the policy 
positions preferred by the median voter in a single dimensional space. As 
voters’ preferences are known, politicians from different parties will 
adopt identical positions (Downs 1957). In real life, however, politicians 
do not always adopt identical positions, largely because elections are 
multidimensional and mandatory voting is never enforceable. Moreover, 
the assumptions of the median voter model do not hold when there is 
no mechanism to establish binding policy commitments and when politi-
cians have strong policy preferences (Alesina 1988). Furthermore, politi-
cians may also have electoral incentives to adopt more extreme positions 
– for instance, to attract a decisive amount of voters and generate more 
opportunities for campaign funding (Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro 
2005). This effect could be intensified in a voluntary voting scheme, 
because people with stronger political preferences are more likely to 
turnout to vote. Indeed, Miller and Dassoneville (2016) find that left-of-
center parties in the Netherlands benefited from a change from compul-
sory to voluntary voting. 
Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) use a repeated game to show two 
possible scenarios. If politicians can enhance their credibility through 
their reputation, they have incentives to honor their moderate policy 
promises. Consequently, we would observe a high degree of policy con-
vergence. Nevertheless, if the costs of deviating from a commitment are 
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sufficiently low, and if politicians have fixed policy positions, policy 
divergence is more likely to occur.  
Gary Cox (1990) identifies additional factors that could affect a par-
ty’s position-taking incentives. He argues that the combination of a small 
district magnitude and a large number of votes per voter encourage the 
adoption of moderate positions, while a high district magnitude plus few 
votes per voter promote ideological dispersion. Calvo and Hellwig (2011) 
provide us with new insights, arguing that electoral rules have differential 
effects based on party size. Indeed, for larger parties, majoritarian rules 
tend to encourage the adoption of moderate positions because they can 
use the vote–seat disproportion in their favor. The opposite is true for 
small parties: majoritarian rules incentivize them to take more extreme 
positions because moderate voters are likely to defect from parties that 
are expected to get less seats than their vote share. 
Why Is Chile a Good Case Study? 
Chile’s so-called binominal electoral system (in place between 1989 and 
2013) had unique features that make it suitable for testing the policy 
convergence hypothesis with a RDD. It was an open-list PR system but 
was often labeled as “semi-majoritarian” because of the small district 
magnitude (Nohlen and Fernández 1999). As in single-member districts, 
Chilean voters selected individual candidates from an open-list, but they 
did so within lists. To allocate seats, votes were tallied at the individual 
and list levels, and seats were assigned using the d’Hondt seat allocation 
formula. The first seat was awarded to the coalition with the largest vote 
share. To win both seats, the list with the most votes had to receive twice 
as many votes as the second-place list. In a two-list contest this meant 
that a coalition could secure one seat with one-third of the votes plus 
one. However, to obtain both seats, a coalition had to receive more than 
two-thirds of the vote. Given that this situation was quite unlikely (see 
table 1), the system encouraged, in practice, within-coalition competition. 
For instance, within each list, party A would be likely to secure the seat 
by obtaining one more vote than party B. In this sense the system creat-
ed a FPTP scenario within each coalition of parties. As Bunker and Na-
via (2015) explain, a low district magnitude PR system could be treated 
similarly to an FPTP scheme in some dimensions. 
In Chile’s two-coalition contests the votes that the largest party re-
ceived beyond the one-third threshold were useless unless the coalition 
reached the two-thirds threshold (Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels 
1998). As each of the 60 districts in the Chamber of Deputies and the 19 
  Do Voters Affect Policies? 7
 

 
districts in the Senate elected two seats using open-list PR, the system 
induced the formation of two large coalitions. The prevalence of the two 
coalitions led some to treat Chile as a two-party system (Carey 2002; 
Alemán and Navia 2009; Alemán and Saiegh 2007). 
The two coalitions formed around their support for and opposition 
to the Pinochet dictatorship before the 1988 plebiscite that sanctioned 
the transition to democracy. The center-left Concertación won the 1988 
vote and ruled continuously from 1990 to 2010. In 2010 the Concer-
tación comprised the centrist and confessional Christian Democracy 
(Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) and several left leaning parties 
(LLPs) – namely, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista de Chile, PS), 
Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia), and the Radical Party 
(Partido Radical)2. The Concertación brought together leftists and cen-
trist parties that were at odds before the authoritarian era. The PDC and 
the LLPs often differed on policy choices, both on economic and moral 
issues. 
Originating in the 1950s, the centrist PDC was a faction of the tra-
ditional Chilean Conservative Party (Partido Conservador), which pro-
posed an alternative to capitalism and communism – namely, a third way. 
The party won the presidency for the first time in 1964, when Eduardo 
Frei Montalva obtained 56.1 percent of the vote. In 1970–1973 the PDC 
opposed Allende’s government and formed a coalition with the con-
servative National Party (Partido Nacional). By contrast, the PS (the 
most significant LLP) was a traditional workers’ party that originally 
embraced Marxism. It was also the main party that supported Allende 
and was prosecuted by the military dictatorship that overthrew Allende 
in 1973. Despite their opposition in the 1970s, the PDC and PS (and 
other LLPs) formed a comprehensive center-left coalition to restore 
democracy. After defeating Pinochet in a 1988 plebiscite, the Concer-
tación ruled uninterruptedly from 1990 to 2010. Because of their past 
differences, there was continued debate about the survival of ideological 
differences between the PDC and the LLPs. 
The rightist Alianza was formed by National Renewal (Renovación 
Nacional, RN), a moderate center-right party, and the Independent 
Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI), a right-
wing party most closely associated with the Pinochet legacy. Both parties 
have their roots in the National Party that opposed Allende and support-
ed the military dictatorship. United in a single party until 1987, the UDI 
                                                 
2  Although the Communist Party (Partido Comunista) did not belong formally to 
the coalition, they competed within the list in the 2009 election. Thus, starting 
from 2009, we counted this party within the Concertación list. 
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and RN broke apart before the restoration of democracy but competed 
in elections as members of the same coalition after 1989. The Alianza 
first won a presidential election in 2010. Unlike the parties in the Con-
certación, those in the Alianza had been on the same ideological side for 
decades. After 1989, the two coalitions dominated legislative elections. 
As table 1 shows, the Concertación and the Alianza in total won more 
than 95 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies between 1997 
and 2013. 
Table 1.  Distribution of Coalition Level Results by Districts in Chile, 1997–
2013 
Election 
year 
Each 
coalition 
won one 
seat 
One 
coalition 
won 
both 
seats 
Third-
party 
party 
won one 
seat 
Total 
number of 
districts 
Total num-
ber of elected 
legislators 
(Chamber of 
deputies) 
1997 45 11 4 60 120 
2001 54 5 1 60 120 
2005 52 7 1 60 120 
2009 57 1 2 60 120 
2013 45 11 4 60 120 
N 253 35 12 300 600 
% 84.33 11.67 4   
Source:  Authors with data from Servicio Electoral <www.servel.cl>. For 2009, the three 
legislators from the Communist Party are counted within the Concertación. 
Another important institutional feature of the Chilean political regime is 
its presidential nature. As Siavelis (2002) points out, the president has co-
legislative powers due to the president’s agenda-setting ability and exclu-
sive prerogative for introducing bills that involve disbursement of fiscal 
resources. However, given that presidents are typically supported by a 
coalition of parties, strong presidents could also moderate their position 
in order to seek congressional approval. The 1980 Constitution inherited 
from the dictatorship was substantially reformed in 2005 under President 
Ricardo Lagos of the Concertación. This included modifying the faculty 
of the executive to control the legislative agenda, increasing the power of 
Congress to create investigative commissions, and creating a mechanism 
for Congress to summon cabinet members for inquiries (Fuentes 2010). 
Still, the reform did not alter the presidential nature of the political re-
gime. For the purposes of this paper, the relevance of the presidential 
regime stems from legislators’ level of autonomy from the ruling coali-
tion. Indeed, legislators from government coalition parties may have 
voted as a block in favor of bills introduced by the executive, attenuating 
their internal differences. If this did occur, we should observe more 
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policy convergence between the parties of the ruling coalition than be-
tween opposition parties.  
Empirical Strategy 
Since the probability of a coalition getting both seats was small, candi-
dates competed against their coalition partners. That made competition 
within each coalition under the binominal system similar to that in the 
single-member district system of the US. Despite having a PR system, 
Chile lends itself to comparisons with the US because the electoral rules 
have a similar effect in the two countries – between parties in the US and 
within coalitions in Chile. Therefore, within each list, candidates could 
seek the support of the median voter in their ideological niche. Applying 
a RDD to close elections in Chile allows us to expand the scope of the 
model beyond single-member districts to PR arrangements, focusing on 
within-coalition competition rather than on between-party contests. 
Within-list competition produces drastically different results if the 
candidates get more than 50 percent of the within-list vote. Thus, a par-
ty’s within-list vote share constitutes a forcing variable that deterministi-
cally assigns treatment when passing the 50 percent threshold. By invok-
ing the continuity assumption (De la Cuesta and Imai 2016), the only 
change that occurs at the within-coalition 50 percent vote-share thresh-
old is a shift in the treatment status – in this case, getting elected for the 
Chilean Chamber of Deputies. Thus, we are able to estimate local aver-
age treatment effects (LATEs) using a RDD for both coalitions. Specifi-
cally, we aim to look at the within-list relationship between party vote 
share and legislators’ latent ideology in roll-call voting at the 50 percent 
threshold. If the convergence hypothesis holds, legislators who barely 
outperform their coalition partners should attempt to represent the me-
dian voter within their coalitions. If the divergence hypothesis holds, 
these legislators should vote based on ideological and partisan motiva-
tions. 
Following De la Cuesta and Imai (2016), we do not contend that 
close winners and losers have the same distribution in pretreatment co-
variates. In other words, we are not arguing for local randomization at 
the cutoff point. Rather, we assume the existence of continuity in the 
potential outcomes, an assumption that is much less stringent than “as if 
random” (in the results section, we test the continuity assumption with 
pretreatment covariates). Formally, the continuity assumption can be 
written as: 
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Xi represents the forcing variable, which deterministically assigns treat-
ment. Y (0) and Y (1) represent the potential outcome of unit i under 
treatment and control conditions, respectively. In this case the treatment 
is to win the election within each coalition. More specifically, when Xi is 
greater than a cutoff point c, the unit is assigned to treatment. It is worth 
noting that the treatment assignment probability is either 0 or 1, condi-
tional on Xi. Equation 1 and 2 imply that the conditional expectation of 
Y (1) and Y (0) at the cutoff point c can be approximated by taking the 
limit from above (below) when x approximates c. Therefore, the LATE 
could be written as follows: 
 
This means that the difference in the conditional expectation of Y (1) 
and Y (0) can be defined as the difference between the limits on both 
sides of the threshold. In other words, the LATE represents the predict-
ed value of Y (1) given the cutoff point Xi=c, minus the predicted value 
of Y (0) when Xi= c. 
We estimate the LATE of barely winning an election on the legisla-
tive behavior of the barely winners following Lee, Moretti, and Butler’s 
(2004) analysis of the US House of Representatives and several other 
papers that employ similar empirical strategies (e.g., Eggers and Hain-
mueller 2009; Galasso and Nannincini 2011; and, for an application to 
the Chilean context, Salas 2016). Moreover, we use the McCrary test in 
order to discard any possibility of electoral fraud. For both coalitions, 
there is no discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable (see ap-
pendix). 
Our dependent variable is a latent ideology measure, estimated 
through the W-nominate package developed by Poole et al. (2011), 
which is typically used to build legislators’ ideal points in a yea/nay ma-
trix of roll-call voting.3 Developed by MacRae (1958) and Cahoon, 
                                                 
3  Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) also used this package in one of their estima-
tions.  
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Hinich, and Ordeshook (1976) the basic idea is that all legislators have an 
ideal point that represents their ideology. Legislators maximize utility by 
voting for the option that minimizes the distance between the yea/nay 
location and their ideal point, which is defined as an “error term” or a 
stochastic component. 
The W-nominate package is the most popular method to recover 
legislators’ ideal points. The package estimates the underlying ideology 
for every legislator given a set of roll-call votes (the W-nominate package 
only considered roll-call votes where more than 2.5 percent of legislators 
voted with the minority side). We used the package to estimate a contin-
uous measure of political ideology by using the matrix of roll-call votes, 
where higher scores mean a more conservative ideology. Indeed, table 2 
shows the average W-nominate score for each party during all consid-
ered legislative periods. Cleary, both the LLPs and the PDC are closer to 
-1, while RN and the UDI are closer to 1. 
Table 2.  Mean and Median W-Nominate Index by Party in the Chamber of 
Deputies, 1998–2013 
Party 1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010 2010–2014 
LLP -0.87 -0.91 -0.83 -0.54 
PDC -0.84 -0.81 -0.70 -0.41 
RN 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.66 
UDI 0.83 0.88 0.85 0.84 
Average -0.20 0.00 0.02 0.23 
# Nonunani-
mous roll-call 
votes 
685 793 890 1373 
Source:  Authors with data from Chilean Library of Congress <www.bcn.cl>. The total 
number of roll-call votes is 3,741. Each legislative period goes from 11 March 
to 10 March of the following year.  
We aim to estimate the following equations: 
 
RCi =  + 1(PDC share)i + 2(PDC)i + 3(cov)i (5) 
 
RCi =  + 1(UDI share)i + 2(UDI)i + 3(cov)i (6) 
 
In equations 5 and 6 the dependent variable is the latent ideology in roll-
call voting (RC), measured through W-nominate; PDC/UDI share is a 
fourth-order polynomial of the within- coalition PDC/UDI vote share; 
PDC/UDI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the PDC/UDI candidate 
was elected (obtained more than 50 percent within the coalition); and cov 
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is a set of district controls. The coefficient 2 represents the LATE, 
meaning that the identified effect only applies to units close to the 50 
percent threshold within the respective coalitions. We additionally esti-
mate these parameters through bias-corrected local linear regression with 
optimal bandwidth, as developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 
(2014). 
Data 
We used data from the Chilean Electoral Registry (Servicio Electoral, 
Servel) – which includes the vote share of every candidate by congres-
sional district – for the 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2009 congressional elec-
tions. Two of those elections (2005 and 2009) were held concurrently 
with presidential elections. As shown above in table 1, between 1997 and 
2013, a coalition secured both seats in only 35 (11.67 percent) of the 300 
races. In the other 265 elections, seats were divided between the two 
leading coalitions or between one of the coalitions and a third-party 
candidate. In addition, we used roll-call data for all legislators in the four 
congressional periods. There were a total of 8,540 roll-call votes between 
1998 and 2009, of which 3,741 were nonunanimous.4 The data is availa-
ble at the Chilean Library of Congress; though we coded it ourselves. We 
used 383 legislator-level observations in all (184 for the Concertación 
and 199 for the Alianza), excluding districts where a coalition won both 
seats, a third-party candidate was victorious, two LLP members or an 
independent and an LLP competed within the Concertación, or an inde-
pendent competed within the Alianza.  
Finally, in order to check continuity at the 50 percent threshold, we 
added some pretreatment covariates, such as average years of schooling, 
average age, the log of the average household income, share of urban 
population, share of the population living in poverty, share of male pop-
ulation, share of people in the labor force, and share of married popula-
tion. We obtained these pretreatment covariates from the Chilean Socio-
economic Household Survey (CASEN) for the years 1998,5 2001, 2003, 
and 2009. Table 3 displays the summary statistics for the pretreatment 
covariates.  
                                                 
4  We define a nonunanimous outcome as roll-call voting where at least more 
than 2.5 percent of legislators voted differently than the majority.  
5  The data from CASEN 1998 was collected in 1997, concurrently with the 
election. Thus, I could not have been affected by the election. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics Pretreatment Covariates 
Period 1998–
2002 
2002–
2006 
2006–
2010 
2010–
2014 
Total 
% Urban 0.86 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84 
Average age 30 30.8 33.2 34.7 32.2 
% Married 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.32 
Average years of 
schooling 9.6 9.5 10 10.1 9.8 
% Labor participation 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.46 
% Male 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 
% Under poverty 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.17 
Log household income 12.9 12.9 13.3 13.4 13.2 
Source:  CASEN Survey for 1998, 2001, 2003, and 2009. 
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
As explained above, we aim to exploit the 50 percent threshold within 
the two dominant political coalitions: the center-left Concertación and 
the rightist Alianza. Thus, we present separate results for each coalition. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationships between the within-coalition vote 
shares obtained by the PDC and the UDI (x-axis), respectively, and la-
tent ideology (y-axis) for the pooled data for the period 1998–2014. In 
the W-nominate index higher scores mean a more conservative ideology. 
To the right of the 50 percent threshold, the observed legislator belongs 
to the PDC (figure 1) or the UDI (figure 2). Below the cutoff point, the 
legislator belongs to the LLPs (figure 1) or the RN (figure 2). The line 
represents a local polynomial fit with confidence intervals. 
In figure 1 we observe a small but significant discontinuity at the 50 
percent threshold, suggesting that the PDC legislators who barely won 
the election tended to vote in alignment with their party’s ideological 
preferences rather than with the preferences of the center-left median 
voter. In the Alianza the discontinuity is much more pronounced. As 
figure 2 shows, there is a large jump at the 50 percent threshold, suggest-
ing that UDI legislators who barely won tended to vote much more 
conservatively than RN legislators who barely won. In this sense, the 
graphs prove the presence of discontinuities in both coalitions, although 
they are much greater within the Right than in the center-left. 
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Figure 1. Ideology Index and Legislator Vote Share within the Concer-
tación 
 
Source:  Chilean Electoral Service and Library of Congress. The y-axis represents the 
ideology index built from the W-nominate package (Poole et al. 2011), where 
higher scores mean a more conservative ideology. The x-axis represents the 
PDC legislator vote share. We used 3,741 non-unanimous roll-call votes to es-
timate the ideology index and 215 races.  
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Figure 2. Ideology Index and Legislator Vote Share within the Alianza 
 
Source:  Chilean Electoral Service and Library of Congress. The y-axis represents the 
ideology index built from the package W-nominate (Poole et al. 2011), where 
higher scores mean a more conservative ideology. The x-axis represents the 
UDI legislator vote share. 
If we compare within the same coalition at two different periods, we 
observe an interesting pattern. As figure 3 shows, under the center-left 
Concertación governments (1998–2010), there is a small but significant 
discontinuity at the 50 percent threshold. This discontinuity widens sig-
nificantly during the 2010–2014 period, which corresponds to the Alian-
za government. In the case of the Alianza legislators, we observe large 
discontinuities during both periods (figure 4), although it appears that 
the gap between barely winners from the UDI and RN is somewhat 
reduced in the 2010–2014 period. In this sense, it seems that for both 
coalitions, policy divergence was exacerbated when the parties were in 
opposition. 
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Figure 3. Ideology Index and Legislator Vote Share within the Concer-
tación 
Source:  Chilean Electoral Service and Library of Congress. 
Figure 4. Ideology Index and Legislator Vote Share within the Alianza 
 
Source:  Chilean Electoral Service and Library of Congress. 
To visually test the continuity assumption, we plot the relationship be-
tween six pretreatment covariates and both forcing variables. The covari-
ates are the share of people in the labor force, average age, average years 
of schooling, the log of average household income, the share of male 
population, and the share of urban population. Figure 5 shows the anal-
yses of these results, with the PDC vote share on the x-axis and the pre-
treatment covariates on the y-axis. Figure 6 replicates this analysis with 
the UDI vote share (x-axis). Figures 5 and 6 show that there is neither a 
significant nor substantive discontinuity in the predicted value at the 
respective thresholds.  
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Figure 5. Six Pretreatment Covariates and Legislator Vote Share within 
the Concertación 
 
Source:  Chilean Electoral Service and CASEN survey.  
Note:  The y-axes represent eight different pretreatment covariates, such as average 
age, share of people in the labor force, the log of average household income, 
share of male population, share of married population, and average years of 
schooling. The x-axes represent the PDC legislator vote share. 
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Figure 6. Six Pretreatment Covariates and Legislator Vote Share within 
the Alianza 
 
Source:  Chilean Electoral Service and CASEN survey.  
Note:  The y-axes represent eight different pretreatment covariates, such as average 
age, share of people in the labor force, the log of average household income, 
share of male population, share of married population, and average years of 
schooling. The x-axes represent the UDI legislator vote share. 
Inferential Analysis 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression discontinuity estimation for 
the Concertación using different specifications. The first row represents 
the treatment effect, which is denoted by an indicator variable at the 50 
percent threshold of the PDC vote share within the coalition. The first 
two columns show the coefficients of bias-corrected local polynomial 
regressions (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014). The third and fourth 
columns show the estimated coefficients through a fourth-order poly-
nomial. In both cases we estimated the reduced form and the covariate-
adjusted model. Table 5 replicates the same estimation for the Alianza 
coalition.  
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Table 4. Regression Estimates within the Concertación, 1998–2013 
 RD 
robust 
RD 
robust 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
PDC 50 + .097 .155 0.99 0.172 
.055 0.043*** 0.035** 0.024*** 
Covariate-
adjusted No Yes No Yes 
Note:  The coefficient PDC 50 + represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the PDC 
legislator obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value < 0.001. 
Table 5. Regression Estimates within the Alianza, 1998–2013 
 RD 
robust 
RD 
robust 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
UDI 50 + 0.224 0.265 0.26 0.254 
0.055*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
Covariate-
adjusted No Yes No Yes 
Note:  The coefficient UDI 50 + represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UDI 
legislator obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value < 0.001. 
Consistently, there is a statistically significant and small effect within the 
Concertación, which ranges from 0.097 to 0.176. The coefficient is statis-
tically significant in three of the four specifications. This means that at 
the 50 percent threshold, a PDC legislator was around 0.1 units more 
conservative than an LLP legislator. This seems to be consistent with the 
distinct historical roots of the PDC and the LLPs. However, there is a 
much larger overall effect within the Alianza. Table 5 shows that the 
treatment effect fluctuates between 0.22 and 0.26 units in the ideological 
measure, meaning that UDI legislators elected by a slim margin were 
substantially more conservative than their RN counterparts.  
Why was ideological divergence larger in the Alianza than in the 
Concertación, whose parties were at odds at crucial moments in recent 
history? A plausible explanation could be related to the presidential na-
ture of the Chilean political regime. As mentioned above, the president 
has the exclusive right to introduce tax-related bills. Thus, the executive 
could exert pressure on legislators to support the president’s agenda. If 
this is the case, parties in government may have voted more as a block 
when supporting presidential policies, thus attenuating partisan differ-
ences; however, if these same parties were in opposition, legislators may 
have voted more in line with party preferences. In order to test this hy-
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pothesis, we estimated the regression discontinuity separately for the 
Concertación and Alianza governments. 
Table 6.  Regression Estimates within the Concertación during Concer-
tación Governments, 1998–2010 
 RD 
robust 
RD 
robust 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
PDC 50 + 0.094 0.112 0.083 0.12 
0.030** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
Covariate-
adjusted No Yes No Yes 
Note:  The coefficient PDC 50 + represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UDI 
legislator obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value < 0.001. 
Table 7.  Regression Estimates within the Concertación during Alianza 
Government, 2010–2014 
  RD 
robust 
RD robust 4th-order 
polynomial 
4th-order 
polynomial 
PDC 50 + 
0.249 
Not enough obser-
vations for local 
estimations 
0.311 .398 
.123*  0.115** 0.096*** 
Covariate-
adjusted No Yes No Yes 
Note:  The coefficient PDC 50 + represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UDI 
legislator obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value < 0.001. 
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients for the Concertación period 
(1998–2010), when the PDC and LLPs held power. Table 7 displays the 
coefficients for the 2010–2014 period under the Alianza government. 
Clearly, the gap between the PDC and the LLP is much larger in the 
latter period, meaning that the ideological differences between the PDC 
and the LLPs were more pronounced when they were in opposition.  
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Table 8.  Regression Estimates within the Alianza during Concertación 
Governments, 1998–2010 
  RD 
robust 
RD robust 4th-order poly-
nomial 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
UDI 50 + 0.25 0.277 0.306 0.301 
.081** 0.098** 0.061*** 0.064*** 
Covariate-
adjusted No Yes No Yes 
Note:  The coefficient UDI 50 + represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UDI 
legislator obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value < 0.001. 
Table 9.  Regression Estimates within the Alianza during Concertación 
Governments, 2010–2014 
  RD 
robust 
RD ro-
bust 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
4th-order poly-
nomial 
UDI 50 + 0.192 0.219 0.164 0.149 
0.036*** 0.36*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 
Covariate-
adjusted No Yes No Yes 
Note:  The coefficient UDI 50 + represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UDI 
legislator obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value < 0.001. 
A similar pattern is observed in the Alianza. When in opposition (table 
8), the estimated ideological gap between the UDI and RN was between 
0.24 and 0.3 units. However, when these parties became part of the rul-
ing coalition (table 9), the gap reduced to 0.14–0.21. In this sense, for the 
parties of the two major political alliances, being in the ruling coalition 
induced them to vote more similarly to their list companions and closer 
to the preferences of their coalitions’ median voters. In this respect par-
ties behave more like a unified block while they are in government. 
To corroborate the previous hypothesis, we employ a RDD on a 
period-by-period basis, with each period corresponding to a different 
congressional session. For the Concertación coalition (table 10), we can 
clearly observe that the coefficient of a barely elected PDC legislator 
substantially increases for the 2010–2014 period. Moreover, we observe 
that the ideological gap was practically nonexistent for the 1998–2002 
period; although it started to increase in the subsequent years. Indeed, in 
the last period under Concertación governments (2006–2010), the aver-
age difference between a PDC and a LLP legislator was 0.183. This sug-
gests that the executive apparently lost some of its capacity to discipline 
the coalition parties. 
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Table 10. Regression Estimates within the Concertación by Congressional 
Term  
  1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010 2010–2014 
PDC 50 + 0.027 0.101 0.183 0.311 
0.020 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.115** 
Covariate adjusted No No No No 
Note:  The coefficient PDC 50 + represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UDI 
legislator obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value < 0.001. 
Table 11. Regression Estimates within the Alianza by Congressional Term 
  1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010 2010–2014 
UDI 50 + 0.298 0.368 0.26 0.164 
0.107* 0.14* 0.046*** 0.032*** 
Covariate adjusted No No No No 
Note:  The coefficient UDI 50 + represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UDI 
legislator obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value < 0.001. 
In the Alianza a similar pattern emerges (table 11). While in opposition 
(1998–2002, 2002–2005, and 2006–2010), there was a substantive gap 
between barely elected UDI and RN legislators, meaning that the legisla-
tive behavior of UDI legislators was consistently much more conserva-
tive than that of RN legislators. Indeed, the gap fluctuated between 0.26 
and 0.36. However, this trend completely reversed in the 2010–2014 
period and decreased to 0.16 – precisely when the UDI and RN were the 
two main government parties. Again, it seems like the presidential nature 
of the Chilean political institutions induced parties to act more as a block 
and target the median voter while serving as members of the ruling coali-
tion.  
Robustness Checks  
Tables 12 and 13 show the placebo regressions used in order to test 
possible discontinuities at the 50 percent threshold. We used nine ob-
served confounders as dependent variables in the Concertación and the 
Alianza. The coefficients were estimated through bias-corrected local 
polynomial regressions (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014). As the 
tables show, there is not a significant discontinuity in either of the ob-
served confounders. Thus, we our confident that our treatment effect 
estimates have been correctly identified and can be attributed to barely 
winning an election rather than any other factor. 
  Do Voters Affect Policies? 23
 

 
Table 12. Placebo Regressions within the Concertación 
Dependent Variable B / SE 
Log household income -.089 
  .171 
Share of population living under poverty -.018 
  .061 
Share of female population .0066 
  .007 
Share of labor participation .010 
  .022 
Average years of schooling -.086 
  .722 
Share of married population -.019 
  .018 
Average age -.410 
  1.051 
Share of urban population .0073 
  .083 
Note:  Each coefficient represent a dummy variable equal to 1 if the DC legislator 
obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value 
< 0.001. 
Table 13. Placebo Regressions within the Alianza 
Placebo Estimates Alianza B / SE 
Log household income -.257 
  .25282 
Share of population living under poverty .025 
  .054 
Share of female population .0019 
  .0061 
Share of labor participation -.054 
  .029 
Average years of schooling -.869 
  .934 
Share of married population .0202 
  .012 
Average age .730 
  1.30 
Share of urban population -.177 
 .128 
Note:  Each coefficient represent a dummy variable equal to 1 if the UDI legislator 
obtained more than 50 percent of the vote within the coalition. Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level. * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value 
< 0.001. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we demonstrated the applicability of RDDs in close elec-
tions in open-list PR systems with small district magnitudes. By exploit-
ing the dynamic of internal competition in the Chilean electoral system, 
we estimated LATEs at the 50 percent threshold for the two major coali-
tions. Both the descriptive and inferential analyses showed that in both 
the Concertación and the Alianza, there is a substantive and significant 
discontinuity at the 50 percent threshold – though this tends to be higher 
in the Alianza. This implies that, overall, within-coalition competition 
with majoritarian rules does not have a significant effect on legislator’s 
policy positions in the four major parties in Chilean politics (i.e., the 
PDC, LLPs, UDI, and RN), since narrow winners tend to vote along 
partisan lines rather than according to the position of their coalition’s 
median voter. Thus, there is strong causal evidence in favor of the policy 
divergence hypothesis.  
The extent of the divergence was not constant over time. We ob-
served in both coalitions that within-coalition divergence was much 
lower when parties were in government than when they were in opposi-
tion. In fact, there was total convergence between the PDC and the 
LLPs during the 1998–2002 period. This intriguing result suggests that 
the presidential nature of the Chilean political system induces govern-
ment parties to converge more on the median voter and push for the 
president’s platform. The evidence presented here strongly indicates that 
this dynamic is behind the higher degree of overall divergence observed 
in the Alianza compared to the Concertación. During the period consid-
ered in this paper, the Alianza was in opposition in three of the four 
legislative terms, meaning that they had fewer incentives to converge on 
a single policy position. In contrast, the Concertación was in power from 
1998–2010, precisely the period when the PDC and the LLPs exhibited a 
higher degree of convergence.  
Consistent with Lee, Moretti, and Butler’s (2004) results, we show 
that – generally speaking – legislators seem to pursue their own policy 
agenda, which is not really modified by the coalition’s median voter. In 
Chile’s presidential regime, however, the evidence shows that parties 
tended to converge more when they were part of the ruling coalition, 
probably because they were seeking to support the president’s agenda. In 
this sense our main substantive contribution is that we have introduced 
new variables that alter a legislator’s policy stance: the nature of the polit-
ical regime and the government–opposition dynamic. More concretely, 
we have shown that in a presidential regime, parties from the ruling coa-
lition have greater incentives to converge than do opposition parties. 
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To advance this research agenda, we propose five suggestions: First, 
we could expand the number of years of roll-call votes and estimate the 
overall effect for a larger time frame, including data points from the early 
1990s. This would allow us to see whether the LLPs and PDC also con-
verged during the first two legislative terms (1990–1998) under Concer-
tación governments. Second, we could estimate the effects of within-
coalition competition in Chile on different outcomes, such as the result 
in the next election (incumbency advantage) or the selection of future 
candidates. Third, we could explore specific policy areas and analyze the 
degree of policy convergence on, for example, economic versus moral 
issues. Fourth, we could apply the analysis to different electoral systems. 
Since we have demonstrated that RDDs can be applied to small magni-
tude open-list PR systems in the event of close elections, there might be 
other PR systems that can also be used to test the validity of the policy 
convergence hypothesis. Fifth, we could use another case study to test 
how generalizable the main results of this paper are. For example, we 
could explore the policy convergence hypothesis in a less presidential 
country, where legislators presumably face less pressure to support the 
president’s agenda. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. McCrary Test 
Category McCrary test
Discontinuity estimate (log difference in height) 
PDC vote share 
.076
(.297) 
Discontinuity estimate (log difference in height) 
UDI vote share 
-0.345
(.388) 
Note:  P-values in parentheses. 
 
¿Los votantes afectan las políticas públicas? Competencia intra-
coalición en el sistema electoral chileno 
Resumen: Las elecciones que se ganan por estrecho margen podrían 
llevar a convergencia en las políticas públicas en la medida que los legis-
ladores electos por una estrecha votación tienen más probabilidades de 
adoptar posiciones moderadas (Downs 1957). No obstante, Lee, Moretti 
y Butler (2004) encontraron que la competencia electoral no afecta las 
preferencias de políticas públicas de los legisladores en los Estados Uni-
dos, cuestionando así el paradigma del votante mediano. Para ayudar a 
discernir la paradoja, estimamos el efecto de elecciones con estrecho 
margen en las posiciones de políticas públicas que adoptan después los 
legisladores, bajo distintas reglas electorales. Con el sistema de represen-
tación proporcional de dos diputados por distrito de Chile, usamos las 
dinámicas de competencia intra-coalición para testear ambas hipótesis. 
Usando el margen de victoria en las 383 elecciones a nivel de distrito en 
4 elecciones legislativas y los 3741 votos en sala de los 120 miembros de 
la Cámara de Diputados entre 1998 y 2014, reportamos que la compe-
tencia electoral no llevó a convergencia de políticas públicas, ni bajo el 
gobierno centroizquierdista Concertación ni bajo el mandato de la dere-
chista Alianza. La convergencia en políticas públicas responde a incenti-
vos electorales, pero también está condicionada por la naturaleza del 
régimen político (presidencial o parlamentario) y por las dinámicas entre 
el gobierno y la oposición. 
Palabras clave: Chile, votante mediano, preferencias de los legisladores, 
sistema de representación proporcional, regresión discontinua 
